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I. 
THE DECLINE OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMY, 
1800·1860 
John H. Coatsworth 
The economic decline that accompanied Mexico's independence prob~ 
ably began in the 1780s. It lasted nearly a century. As industrial revolu' 
tions stimulated economic advance in the North Atlantic countries, 
Mexico slipped farther and still farther behind. Mexico's decline in this 
era determined the magnitude of the productivity gap that has separated 
the Mexican economy from the developed world ever since. If Mexico 
had managed to achieve a rate of cconom ic growth equal to that of its 
northern neighbor between 1800 and 1860, then the country's 1950 per 
capita income would have been achieved by 1900 and Mexico would now 
rank among the world's most developed economies with a per capita 
income comparable to that ofItaly or even the United Kingdom.Instead, 
Mexico's per capita GDP fell from roughly half that of the United States 
in 1800 to less than one seventh by 1860 and has fluctuated around that 
level ever since (Coats worth 1978: 82). 
Major institutional changes accompanied Mexico's economic decline. 
The Spanish Cortes enacted legislation between 1811 and 1813 that took 
the Bourbon assault on corporate privilege to a new stage by disestab-
lishing the guilds, ending ethnic restrictions on employment, and abol-
ishing the Indian head tax (tribu!o). With independence came proclama· 
tions of the legal equality of citizens (save clerics and military officers) 
and the abolition of entail and titles of nobility. Public enforcement of 
the Church tithe ended in 1833. Corporate property and the ecclesiastical 
and military jueros were abolished in 1856 and 1857. The liberalization of 
trade that began under the Bourbons was extended to open direct trade 
with allies and neutrals during the wars of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon. Independence opened Mexico to the commerce of the world, 
ended enforcement of laws restricting immigration and foreign resi-
dency, and reduced colonial restrictions on the importation of capital. In-
ternal monopolies, like the tobacco estanco, were maintained and revived 
from time to time, but without success; by the 18505, these, too, had 
disappeared. In short, Mexico took major steps toward eliminating in5ti-
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tutional obstacles to modern capitalist development during this period 
of economic decline. In fact, economic decline actually encouraged 
experimentation and undermined all attempts to revive colonial institu-
tions and policies (Walker 1984). 
This essay will analyze changes in the Mexican econom y from the late 
co lonial period to approximately 1860. Its purpose is to contribute to 
knowledge of the dimensions of Mexico's economic decline and to 
understanding of its causes. The analysis will rely, in part, on new esti-
mates of Mexico's gross domestic product (GOP) in 1800,1845 and 1860. 
The estimates are based partly on fact and partly on disciplined guess-
work. They provide rough indicators of sectoral output for each of these 
benchmark years. While the estimates inevitably contain substantial 
error margins, they mark an advance over the implicit quantification of 
literary accounts by providing explicit and testable calculations upon 
which future research can improve as more and better data become avail-
able. . 
In the first section below, the origins of Mexico's economic decline are 
located in the late colonial era. The second section reviews the demo-
graphic and territorial changes that followed independence. The follow-
ing sections present the new GDP estimates and discuss the changes in 
output and structure they reveal. The final sections analyze the develop-
ment of the external sector and contain some concluding comments. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF DECLINE 
It has become commonplace to contrast the "harmony and prosperity" of 
the colonial era to the conflict and depression of independent .Mexico 
(Rodriguez O. 1983). This contrast is essentially inaccurate. The research 
of the past two decades points clearly to a sustained economic decline in 
the last decades of the colonial era. Indeed, nearly all of the factors cited 
by historians to explain post-independence economic trends were 
powerfully at work decades before the Grito de Dolores. 
The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed important changes 
in agricultural production and productivity. In the Guadalajara region, 
the Bajfo, the Central Valley, and elsewhere as well, population growth 
and urban demand caused a widespread shift from extensive agriculture 
and livestock production to more intensive production of food grains, 
especially maize and wheat (Van Young 1981: chap. 10; Brading 1973; 1978: 
chap. 8; Konrad 1980: cl1ap. 8). The livestock frontier moved north of the 
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Bajfo,and the land thus freed went under the plough. Costs rose as yields 
declined and producers had to pay for transportation from more distant 
fields to urban markets. The earlier gains from regional specialization 
were lost, and the agricultural sector began to experience a steady decline 
in productivity. The famine of1784-85,and the crop failures that occurred 
with increasing regularity thereafter, were due not only to climatic vicissi-
tudes but to the greater variability of crop yields as more and more margi-
nalland was put into production (Florescano 1969). 
To declining productivity in agriculture, it is necessary to add the evi-
dence of trouble in the mining industry. I have already pointed to the 
problem of rising marginal costs, that is, to the increasing cost of produc-
ing each ounce of silver and gold (Coats worth 1986; Garner 1980). 
Government subsidies, in the form of tax relief, soft loans, and lower 
prices for the mercury and gunpowder supplied by government monop-
olies prolonged the life of many mines. But the prosperity of the industry 
depended more and more on government aid, and Spain'S capacity to 
continue the subsidies disappeared in the decade after Hidalgo's revolt. 
The collapse of production in 1811 may be attributed to Hidalgo; the 
ind ustry's failure to recover in the final years of colonial rule had more to 
do with economic factors and declining governmen t aid. 
Foreign competition began its long war against Mexico's artesanal and 
industrial producers long before independence, too. Salvucci (1986) 
has documented the collapse of woolen textiles by the end of the eigh-
teenth century. Cotton textile production faced foreign competition as 
early as the American War for Independence. Competition intensified 
during the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon , and output 
began to suffer well before independence, as Thomson (Ms. 1978: chaps. 
2 and 3; 1986) has shown. In a declining economy, alternative employ-
ment for the resources idled in textile production were simply unavail-
able. 
The chief malady attributed to Independence has been political instabi-
lity and the attendant evils of arbitrary taxation and the lack of security 
for enterprise. Neither of these evils was new. Nostalgia for a colo nial era 
of peaceful productivity can only be sustained by failing to notice that the 
colony was part of a vast empire sustained only by war against increas-
ingly powerful European competitors (Rodrfguez O. 1983). The fiscal 
extortions of the Bourbon reforms and the increasingly destructive eco-
nomic regulation required to enforce them were compounded by Spain'S 
desperation afte r 1796. In the decade after 1800, the full range o f arbitrary 
taxes and forced loans that so cursed the Independence era were im-
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posed by the colonial authorities to suppo rt the war effort. The mos t 
des tructive of these measures, the (olZSolidaciol1 de vales fca/es, did as much 
to destroy the colony 's incipient capital market as any of the measures 
imposed by warring caudillos in the half century after independence. 
Moreover, the colonial government provided vi rtually no services to its 
co nsti tuents, not even internal security. Order collapsed almost as soon 
as it was challenged. Banditry, largely a prod uct of economic distress, 
escalated afte r the famine of the 1780s and again in the period following 
the Hid algo revolt. Colonial officials were virtually powerless to stop it. l 
In short, most of the ills associated with Independence, both economic 
and political, had their origins in the colo nial era. 
II. POPULATION Al"lD NATURAL RESOURCES 
The co lony administered from Mexico City covered nearly 4.5 million 
square kilometers, twice the area of the newly independent United States 
o f America. The Mexican republic which adminis tered this vas t territory 
after 1821 was the larges t of the new nations to emerge from the wreck of 
Spain's empire in the New World. 
In the three decades after independence, Mexico lost half its natio nal ter-
ri tory to its aggressive northern neighbor. The loss of Texas encompas-
sed more than a million square kilometers. An additional 104 million 
square kilometers were ceded by the Treaty of Guadalupe H idalgo in 
1848. In 1853,80,000 square kilometers were sold to the United States 
(tbe Gadsden Purchase) to assure North American entrepreneurs that a 
new transcontinental railroad to California could be constructed enti rely 
on U.S. territory. In that year, the territory of the Mexican republic fell 
below two million square kilometers, while that of the U.S.A. reached 
nearly 8 million. From twice as large in 1800, Mexico fell to one-fourth the 
size of her northern neighbor.? 
The loss o f Texas, the New Mexico terri tories and Upper California 
deprived the Mexican nation of immense natural resources. The full 
extent of this loss first came to light in the year Mexico lost the war with 
the United States. The California "gold rush" began in 1848. W ithin two 
1 William R. Taylor describes the rise of banditry in the Guadalajara region (Taylor 
1988). 
2 Data on the territo rial expansion of the United Sta tes arc foun d in HiJloriral SfaliJ-
lir; (1 960: 236). 
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decades, the los t territories were producing more precious metals than 
all the fabled "silver mou ntains" of old Mexico. By 1900, the mineraJ out-
put alone of the lost terri tories exceeded the national income o f the 
Mexican republic.3 
Since the territo ries los t were sparsely popu lated, Mexico's human 
resources were li ttle affected. In 1800, Alexander von Humboldt esti-
mated the population of New Spain and the northern provin ces at more 
than six million.~ Table 1 presents population es timates for Mexico from 
1800 to 1862. 
At the end of the colonial era, Mexico 's popu lation was growing slowly. 
The slow pace of population growth co ntinued into tbe Ind ependence 
era. Between 1800 and the 1860s, the annual average increase was onlyO.6 
percent. As Mexico lost vast natural resources, th e cou ntry's stock of 
human capital stagnated. Neither in numbers, nor in skiHs or education, 
did the coun try 's population increase much in the first fo ur decades of 
independence. 
Ill. TRENDS IN GOP 
L.1ble 2 presents the new estimates of Mexico's gross domestic product 
mentioned above. Detailed estimates for each sector may be found below 
in the text anu in Table 14. In 1800, gross dom estic product stood at 
roughly 240 million pesos at current prices, or 333 millio n pesos of 1900. 
In comparison to the United States and Great Britain l Mexico's per capita 
product was low, oue half that of the United States and barely one third 
of British per capita product (Coatsworth 1978: 82). Large as it was in 
1800, however, the gap between Mexico and the developed countries 
would never be so narrow again. 
Between 1800 and 1845, Mexico 's real national income stagnated, falling 
some two percent. In per capita terms, however, the fa ll was much larger 
(21.6 percent). This decl ine continued through 1860 (and probably to the 
end of 1860s). 
In comparison to 1800, Mexico's total GOP had fa llen by five percent in 
3 In 1850, total U.S. production of gold and silver amounted to U.S. $ 5\148,730, 
nea rly alt o r it produced in (he former Mexican terricories (HiJfOrical S/tlliJ/iCJ 1960: 
371). In the same year, less tban 20 million pesos were mi nted in Mexico; see Table 
10 below. Mineral output of the United States is repo rted in ibid. (1 960: 360-369). 
4 See Table 1. 
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1860. Population growth in the meanwhile brought per capita real 
income down to a level nearly 30 percent below that of 1800. 
When it becomes possible to construct estimates for the intervening 
years, a more precise view of short· term fluctuations will be possible. It is 
likely, for example, that per capita income in the colo ny began to decline 
as early as the 17805. When the independence movement broke out in 
1810, the short·term decline, especially in mining and government reve· 
nues was especially sharp.' Partial recoveries probably took place in the 
late 1820s and again in the late 18305 and early 1840s." From 1845 to 1860, 
economic activity declined again, in part due to the U.S. invasion (1846-
48) and the interna.! War of the Reform (lS5S-61). Between these two 
wars, another partial recovery may have occurred, only to be reversed. 
Between 1845 and lS60, total income feU 3.5 percent, while per capita 
product fell nine percent. By lS60, Mexico's economy had reached the 
lowest point for which estimates are available. 
These estimates of gross domestic product are the result of efforts to 
reconstruct output sector by sector. The results of these efforts are pre-
sented in Tables 3,4 and 5. 
The sector that suffered least as the economy declined after lS00 was 
probably agriculture. The estimates of agricultura.! production are based 
on scattered data that make it possible to calculate per capita production 
or consumption. They are thus intended to include all output, whether 
marketed or not. Table 6 presents the data on which the maize estimates 
are based. The earliest national estimate is that of Quiros (1973) listed for 
1800, but actually estimated by the author as an "average" for the period 
before the Hidalgo revolt. The Quiros estimate is consistent with later 
data on national consumption per capita, as the table shows. The 1845 
and 1860 figures (125 kilos percapita) embody the assumption that staple 
production could not have declined much, given low income elasticity of 
demand for basic foodstuffs. For 1860, however, Perez Hernandez (lS62: 
103) gives a figure which is far lower (approximately 70 kilos per capita). 
This figure is much closer to the consumption per capita in Mexico City. 
where a substantial minority of the population consumed wheat rather 
5 Sec Table 10 belo w. 
6 The evidence available to document shore-term trends is limited. Foreign trade 
and government revenues increased in the 1820s, and mining production also 
recovered somewhat; see below, Tab les to and 12. For governmen t revenues, see 
Carmagnani (1982).Thomson (Ms. 1978: chap. 3) documents increased activity in 
Puebla's cotton textile industry in the late 1830s and early 1840s. 
The Declifle of the Mexican ECOflOIny, 1800-1860 33 
than maize. For the nation as a whole, higher estimates for 1845 and 1860 
are more reasonable. 
Table 7 presents the per capita consumption and production data on 
which the estimates for wheat, rye and sugar are based. For wheat, con-
sumed mainly in cities, the urban data contain a bias opposite to that 
encountered in the maize data. Quiros estimated national wheat con-
sumption at 25 kilos per capita, less than one fifth the 1792 census esti-
mate of 138. 1 kilos for Mexico City.' An independent estimate of wheat 
production, that of Ortiz de Ayala based on Guada.!ajara data for lS02, put 
national output close to the Quiros estimate, viz., 1,400,000 cargas, or 
21.47 kilos per capita (Ortiz de Aya.!a 1968: 49-53). The data from the Por-
firian era are also quite close to the Quiros estimate, fluctuating around 
20 kilos per capita between 1892 and 1907. 
For 1845 and lS60 wheat output there are no reliable figures. Perez Her-
nandez (lS62: 103) estimated wheat production per capita at 27.9 kilos , a 
figure that seems overly optimistic (in contras t to his low estimate of 
maize production). Instead, national wheat consumption per capita is set 
at much lower levels for the two missing years. Lower levels are consist-
ent with widespread evidence of decline in estate agriculture (especially 
during the lS50s); since wheat was an exclusively estate product that 
required irrigation and special care, these lower levels appear to be more 
plausible.' 
The estimates of output for the remaining agricultural products are 
based on similar sources and methods. The most problematical are the 
estimates of sugar production for lS45 and lS60. While there is no evi-
dence to suggest a notable increase in production, and the estimates 
employed are consistent with contemporary sources, the "boomn in the 
lS70s is unlikely to have raised output from the 60,000 tons indicated by 
Perez Hernandez for 1860 to the 600,000 tons estimated for lS77.' The 
1860 figure is probably too sma.!l, and the 1877 estimate too large, but evi-
dence is lacking to determine the amount of the correction required. 
The sectoral estimates of G DP in Table 3 suggest that the agricultural 
sector withstood the turmoil of the Independence period better than any 
other. The share of agriculture in G DP rose from 21.9 to 27 percent, aceor-
ding to the estimates; while GDP declined by nearly 30 percent per 
7 Quir6s (1973: 236); the Rcvillagigedo census data arc in Orozco y Berra (1973:71). 
8 On the fragmentation of the large estates, see Brading (1978: chap. 8) and Bazant 
(1971) 
9 On the boom in sugar production in the 1870s, see Calder6n (1965: 47"49 ). 
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capita, agricultural output declined o nly 12.5 percent between 1800 and 
1860. Caution is needed, however, in interpreting the data, since the esti-
mates of agricultu ral output actually embody the assumption that food 
production per capita did not decline by much. 
Livestock production appears to have suffered far more than agriculture. 
Table 8 presents data on per capita meat consumption similar to those 
used for the agricultural estimates. The data suggested sharp declines in 
the consumption of mutton and pork and a smaller decline in beef con-
sumption. These estimates are little more than guesswork. The 1800 esti-
mates are based on Quiros (1973: 236). The 1860 beef estimate takes the 
ratio of Mexico City consumption in 1792 to national consumption in 
1800 and applies it to 1860 when only Mexico City data are availab le. The 
1845 estimate merely interpolates a round number. The estimates for 
mutton and pork production employ the same method. The Perez Her-
nandez (1862: 117) estimates for 1860 for all three products are higher 
(see table), but are rejected aga.in for their urban bias. 
A variety of sources were used to construct estimates of other livestock 
products. Quiros and Perez Hernandez provided the starting point in 
each case.1O In most cases, independent sources and data from the Porfi-
riato established reasonable boundaries for the estimates. 
In contrast to agriculture, the estimates oflivestock production suggest a 
sharp decline, much sharper in the case of galla do mmor than in beefcattle 
production. Cattle production did not fall until after the U.S. invasion.As 
a proportion of GOP, livestock production fell from 19.4 to 12.4 between 
1800 and 1860. The weight of agriculture and livestock together remained 
virtually unchanged over this period, as the decline in the livestock share 
was roughly matched by the rising share of agriculture. Together, these 
two sectors accounted for roughly 40 percent of GOP throughout this 
period: 41.3 percent in 1800,44.4 in 1845 and 39.4 in 1860. 
Artisanal and industrial production, the manufacturing sector, accounted 
fo r a far larger share of Mexico's GOP than most accounts have sug-
gested. Table 9 provides deta.iled data on the estimates constructed 
industry by industry. A number of industrial activities are not included in 
the estimates for this sector because they could not be distinguished in 
the data on agricultural and mineral output. Flour milling, one of the 
country's important industries, cannot be estimated apart from the value 
of the agricultural input. The estimates of wheat production in the agri-
cultural sector above actually include the value added by this processing 
10 See Table 8. 
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industry. Even without it, however, the food processing industry emerges 
as the single most important industrial sector. Next in importance was 
the "chemical industry" that produced soap, gunpowder, vegetable oils 
and candles, among other products. 
The manufacturing estimates are based on a number of sources and 
represent value-added estimates constructed by subtracting the value of 
raw materials inputs (that is, the corresponding estimates of agricultural 
or livestock production). Most of the figures are adjusted from the data 
in the Quir6s and Perez Hernandez works." The 1845 data are based on 
official sources that only provide information on the textile and iron, 
steel and munitions industries.!2 
Except for parts of the textile industry that began a short-lived modern-
ization process in the 1830s and early 1840s, the manufacturing sector 
consis ted chiefly of small-scale artisan workshops or cottage "industries". 
Little technological change occurred during this period, save for those 
enterprises that received Banco de Av{o aid to import equipment in the 
1830s.0 The effects of this conservative program were not impressive. 
Most of the textile mills that modernized in this period went bankrupt.<1 
The largest establishments, outside the sugar and flour mills and the 
mine smelters were the tobacco "factories". In the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the Royal Tobacco Factory in Mexico City employed over 3,000 
people. After independence, tobacco processing continued as a public 
sector monopoly leased to private entrepreneurs under various contracts 
unti11856. Tobacco factories did no more than unite under one roof the 
processing activities formerly carried out in scores of individual tobacco 
shops. No technical advance was created by factory production (Walker 
1984). 
As a proportion of GOP, manufacturing remained virtually unchanged 
from 1800 to 1860, fluctu ating arou nd 20 percent. Manufacturing activity 
declined at about the same rate as GOP during this period. 
It Quiros (1973: 262-2(3); Perez Hernandez (1862: chap. 9). See also Rosenzweig 
Hernandez (1963). r have followed Rosenzweig's approach closely; this work is 
the pioneer in historical reconstruction of economic activity for Mexico. 
12 Mrmoria de 11ldwlria (1845 [1846J : n-57). I have accepted {he conclusion ofKere' 
mitsis that the estimates in this report understate textile production; the Keremit· 
sis revisions are thus employed in the GDPescimacc.See Keremitsis (1973: 38-39). 
13 See also Burks (Ms. 1952: chaps. 9·10); Potash (1959: chaps. 3-4); Bazant (1964b). 
The bes t discussion of the textile industry, however, is in Thomson (Ms. 1978: 
chaps. 2-3). 
14 The most detailed account of the losses suffered by entrepreneurs in the textile 
industry ca n be found in Walker (1986: chap. 6). 
36 John H. CoatsworJh 
The same was true for the mining industry, which accounted for a much 
smaller proportion of GOP than either agriculture or manufacturing. 
Official estimates of the production of gold and silver are displayed in 
Table 10. The official estimates only include the o utput that reached the 
mints. Literary evidence suggests that small quantities of gold and silver 
were diverted to contraband before reaching the mint. Actual output 
may have been higher than the official figures indicate.ln some years, the 
government legalized the export of unminted gold and silver. This was 
tcue for 1845 and 1860, for example, so data on exports of unminted gold 
and silver are added to the mint figures in the GOP estimates." 
The mining sector also produced small quantities of copper, lead, tin, 
iron, mercury, and such non-metallic minerals as salt. Estimates of these 
items are also included in the mining sector totals. 
This sector suffered a sharp decline in output after 1810, but by 1845 the 
1800 output of precious metals had already been equalled. In per capita 
terms, however, mining output was substantially lower than in 1800 (16.3 
percent) as late as 1860. This sector did not regain its 1800 level of per 
capita output until the late 1880s. As a proportion of GOP, mining fell 
from 8.2 percent in 1800 to 6.2 percent in 1845.Modestgrowth thereafter, 
while the economy was still declining, raised the figure to 9.7 percent of 
GOP in 1860, higher than in 1800. 
Together, mining and manufacturing represented between a quarter and 
a third of GOP in this period. In 1800, these two sectors together 
accounted for 30.5 percent of GOP. Both fell faster than the economy as 
a whole, reaching 24.5 percent in 1845 and recovering to 31.3 percent 
in 1860. 
Estimates reported in Table 3 for the forestry, fish and game, construc-
tion, transportation, and commercial sectors of the Mexican economy in 
this period represent more guesswork than hard data. Forestry and fish 
and game estimates are found in both Quiros (1973: 262) and Perez Her-
nandez (1862: chap. 5). The 1845 figures are interpolated. The construc-
tion, transportation and commercial sectors are calculated on the basis of 
the weight of these sectors in Mexico's GOP after 1895." It is likely that 
this procedure underestimates the output of these sectors, The largest of 
them, commerce, could have accounted for more than a quarter of G DP, 
15 The expore of metals en paJta is described in Mayer(18H,IL 99). Perez Hernandez 
gives a figure for unminted precious metals exports for 18 57; this is added eo the 
mine figures for 1860 and in the GDP estimate; see Perez Hernandez (1862: 135). 
16 Sectoral weights beginning in 1895 may be found in Solfs (1969: 12). 
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if Mexico's economy followed patterns familiar in the less developed 
world,17 The trend after 1895 was up, with the commercial sector rising 
from 17 to neady 20 peccent within the next two decades (Solis 1969: 12). 
Altogether, the three sectors for which data is totally lacking accoun t for 
20.1 percent of the GDP estimates in each of the three years. 
The public sector of the Mexican economy in this period represented a 
smaller proportion ofGDP than in Europe at the same time, 11I In 1800, 
however, the GOP estimate excludes nearly half the revenues collected 
by the viceregal government because they were exported from the 
colony as net fiscal revenues to subsidize Spanish administration in other 
parts of the empire or to swell the coffers in Madrid (Humboldt 1966a, 
IV: 224-229). Revenues actually spent in New Spain amounted to only 
about 2.35 pesos of1900 per capita, lower than in 1845 or 1860. As a pro-
portion of GOP, government spending imide Ihe country increased dra-
matically, from 4.2 percent in 1800 to roughly seven percent thereafter 
(7.4 percent in 1845 and 6.8 percent in 1860). In terms of the govern-
ment's capacity to extract resources, the data suggest a small decline· 
(from 7.8 percent in 1800). It should be noted, however, that between 
1800 and 1809 the colonial regime resorted to draconian tax measures 
and forced loans which may have raised revenues from 18.7 million pesos 
in 1794 to as much as 68 million in 1809." Even taking into account the 
marked inflation of the intervening years, the 1809 figure could have 
represented as much as 25 percent of GOP. 
Caution should be exercized in interpreting the dataon colonial govern-
ment revenues and expenditures, Both sides of the ledger contain sums 
carried over from previous years and may thus exaggerate the actual flow 
of funds. For this reason, the GOP estimate for 1800 takes the somewhat 
lower estimates of government revenues and expenditure reported by 
Humboldt (1966a). For the republican period, well-known data on feder-
al government activity is used in estimating GDP, but the public sector 
17 See Maddison (1983). Maddison notes that the contemporary service sector of 
LDC economies averages between 24.6 and 44.2 percent ofG DP, depending on 
the method used to estimate national income. 
18 See Maddison (1983) and Baimch (1976); Deane and Cole (1962: 282, 329-330); 
Ardent (1977): 200·204, 220·221). The public sector of the U.S. economy did not 
spend more than five percent of national income for most of the nineteenth ceo· 
turr.. a lower ratio than that of Mexico; see Historical Statistics (1960: 709·730). 
19 Klem (1985: Table J). Data from the Mexico City treasury are found in TePaske 
(1976). Data from all 23 Mexican treasuries will be found in TePaske and Klein 
(Ms.). 
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data also contain estimates of municipal and state expenditures (based 
on their proportion of federal outlays in the Porfirian era),20 
IV. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
As Mexico's GOP fell during the nineteenth century, the country's eco' 
nomic ties to the rest of the world actually grew in importance. That is, 
Mexico's foreign trade declined more slowly than GOP after 1800. Table 
11 measures the significance of foreign trade by estimating the weight of 
the external sector in G DP. Total foreign trade increased from 8.1 percent 
of GOP in 1800 to 12 .3 percent in 1845 and then declined to 9.8 percent in 
1860. 
Precise data on Mexico's foreign trade after independence are only avail-
able for scattered years. Table 12 presents this data together with data on 
the exports of Mexico's principal trading partners during those years 
when Mexican import data are missing. As this table indicates, Mexico's 
foreign trade fluctuated after independence as violently as the country's 
relations with the major foreign powers. 
In the period after 1860, the external sector assumed far greater impor-
tance to the economy than at any point before. In assessing the impact of 
the external sector during the colonial and early Independence period, 
therefore, the later data provide a much needed perspective. Trade was 
important to the Mexican economy even before the restoration of the 
republic in 1867, but the liberal trade and tariff reforms in the 1870s and 
foreign investments that stimulated export production during rhe Porfi-
riato made Mexico a far more dependent country at the end of the nine-
teenth century than ever before, While trade averaged about ten percent 
of GOP before 1870s, by the end of the Porfiriato the significance of the 
external sector had tripled to more than 30 percent of GOP. 
While the perspective suggested by the Porfirian trade figures tends to 
reduce the significance of the export sector in earlier periods, the fact that 
foreign trade increased in relative importance after independence is at 
least as interesting a result of these estimates. Moreover, the dependence 
of government revenues on foreign trade increased even more rapidly 
than the GOP ratio. The burden of national taxation shifted from inter· 
20 Stace government expenditures for 1860 are reported in Perez Hernandez (1862: 
193). In the period 1893-1903, municipal and scate government expend itures 
amounted to approximately 38,4 percent offederalgovernment outlays (Macedo 
1905: chap. 3. ). 
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na! productive and commercial activity to the external sector. Thus, the 
political significance of foreign trade tended to increase even faster than 
its share of GOP. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The new GOP estimates presented in this paper document the decline of 
the Mexican economy from 1800 to 1860, but evidence from the last dec· 
ades of the eighteenth century indicate that the decline started well 
before that date. The GOP estimates depict a stagnant economy, with a 
modest decline of five percent in total product between 1800 and 1860.ln 
per capita terms, however, the decline reached nearly thirty percent. This 
decline in the productivity of the Mexican economy occurred as the 
industrializing nations of the North Adantic were achieving unprece-
dented rates of increase. Thus, Mexico fell even further behind the indus· 
trial nations, 
The sectoral product estimates for the period from 1800 to 1860 record 
no significant shifts in the structure of the economy. The most severely 
depressed sector after independence was livestock production, the most 
resilient was agriculture, Mining and manufacturing output shares of 
GOP were lower in 1845 than in 1800. By 1860, however, manufacturing 
had nearly recovered and the mining sector exceeded its 1800 share of 
GOP. In short, the independent economy virtually replicated, at a lower 
level of production, the structure of the colonial economy. 
Two sectors did experience a modest increase in GDP share. Public sec-
tor expenditures declined absolutely and the proportion ofG OP extract· 
ed in revenue declined slightly, but real government expenditures within 
the country increased both absolutely and relative to GOP. Foreign trade 
also declined more slowly than GOP. Suggestions in the historical litera· 
ture that the external sector lost importance after independence are not 
confirmed by the data which show a marked increase of foreign trade as a 
proportion of GOP between 1800 and 1860." While this increase was 
21 Enrique Florescano y AJejandca Moreno Toscano suggested, in a paper written in 
1972, that the decline of the ex tern al sector after independence caused a significant 
shift in economic activity, trade rouces and the like. See Florescano and Moreno 
Toscano (1976). The argument of this paper remains sound, because it rested on 
analysis of the effects of an absolute decline in foreign trade; the rtialillt impor-
tance of the external sector inmaud, however, even as the volume of transactions 
fell. 
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not as dramatic before 1860 as afterwards, it was nonetheless substantial 
by the standards of the period. 
It is not possible to estimate the value of the income foregone as a result 
of the loss of half the national territory. Nor is it feasible to estimate the 
benefits that could have been reaped by a diversion of public spending 
from military purposes to investment in human capital. Both would 
appear to have been very large indeed. 
As a trading partner, Mexico cannot be described as particularly signifi· 
cant for the countries of Western Europe or the United States. Nonethe-
less, the end of Spain's commercial monopoly did increase the country's 
trade with Western Europe and the United States significantly. Spain's 
share of Mexico's imports fell to insignificance following independence 
(Herrera Canales 1977: chap. 3). Moreover, opportunities for participa-
tion in internal as well as external trade increased, as some Spanish mer-
chants left or were expelled from the country while English, German, and 
French merchant houses established branches or developed close trading 
relations with independent firms established by immigrants from these 
countries.
12 
The protections offered by their respective embassies repli8 
cated the advantages Spanish-born merchants enjoyed in the colonial 
era. 
The decline in economic activity after independence adversely affected 
conservative projects which depended on the creation of a strong cen8 
tealized state endowed with sufficient resources to defend the nation's 
sovereignty over farflung territories and impose social and political 
peace. Although government revenu es available to cover domestic 
expenditures actually increased after independence, they were not suffi-
cient to confront international competition and domestic conflict on a 
far larger scale than colonial governments had faced. 
While conservative centralism was doomed to failure, liberalism was 
weakened by the economic decline as well. Liberal schemes to liquidate 
inherited institutional obstacles to capitalist economic modernization 
lacked both the plausibility and the dynamic social base that could have 
insured an easy victory. Mexico's political stalemate reflected the stagna-
tion and decline of the economy. 
22 See, for example, Tenenbaum (1979). It is interesting to note that, unlike other 
Latin American cou ntries, Mexico imposed no major obstacles to th e participa-
tion of foreign merchants io the internal economic life of the country. For a con-
trary case, see Gootenberg (1982). 
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Table 1 
Population Estimates for Mexico, 1792-1862 (in Thousands) 



















SOflms: Alll/ario Es/adfslico, Mlxico (1966-67 [1969]: 27); see also Navarro y 
Noriega (1820: 30); Humboldt (1966a, I: book 2, chap. 4). 
Table 2 
Gross Domestic Product, 1800-1910 
Cu rrent Pesos Pesos of 1900 
41 
Year Total I Per Capita Total I Per Capita 
(1000's) (IOOO's) 
1800 240,318 40.06 333,057 55.51 
1845 268,746 35.78 326,455 43.52 
1860 292,371 36.54 314,865 39.36 
1877 349,442 36.13 456,220 47.19 
1895 ., 736,467 58.30 903,214 71.50 
1910 2,179,024 143.73 1,600,41 3 105.57 
SOl/m: See text. 
Table 3 












Agriculture 72,891 87,498 84,987 113,937 179,660 339,170 
Livestock 64,488 56,442 39,051 62,118 162,630 195,130 
Forestry 10,088 9,744 4,673 10,789 2,470 5,590 
Fish and Game 341 3,247 3,904 5,434 
Mining 27,318 20,331 30,535 47,649 56,940 135,070 
Manufactures 74,306 59,823 68,104 74,005 115,700 238,680 
Construction 2,018 1,948 1,857 2,801 5,330 13,260 
Transport 8,3 11 8,117 7,737 11,308 29,640 42,770 
Government 14 ,123* 24 ,111 21,402 51,198 80,704 114,513 
Commerce 55,670 55,194 52,615 76,981 152,100 309,0 10 
Miscellaneous 3,503 118,040 207,220 
Grand Total 333,057 326,455 314,865 456,220 903,214 1,600,413 
Pesos Per Capita 55.51 43.52 39.36 47.19 71.50 105.57 
* Excludes uncompensated overseas rem ittances of fiscal revenues amounting to 
13,750,000 pesos. 
SOllm: See text. 
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Table -1 Table 6 
Sectoral Outpu t Per Capita, 1800-1910 (Pesos of 1900) Maize Production and Consumption Pcr Capi ta (Kilograms Per Capita) 
SectorlYear I 1800 1 '845 I 1860 I 1877 I 1895 1910 National Mexico Nuevo Le6 n 
Agricu lture 12.15 11.67 10.62 11.79 14 .22 22.37 
Estimates City Output Estimates 
Year (Output) (Consump- Cadereyta Linares Monte-Livestock to.75 7.53 4.88 6.43 12.87 12.87 tion) moreios 
Forestry 1.68 1.30 0.58 1.1 2 0.20 0.37 
Fish an d Game 0.06 0.43 0.49 0.56 1792 123.8 
Mining 4.55 2.71 3.8 1 4.92 4.5 1 8.91 
Manufacturing 12.39 7.97 8.52 7.66 9. 16 15.74 1800 133.0 
Construction 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.42 0.87 
Transportation 1.38 1.08 0.97 1.17 2.35 2.82 18 17-21 89.4 
Government 2.3"" 3.21 2.68 5.29 6.39 7.55 
Commerce 9.28 7.36 6.58 7.96 12.04 20.38 1824 70.3 210AO 
Miscellaneous 0.58 9.34 13.69 1825 119.25 73 .51 
Total 55.5 1 41.52 39.36 47.19 71.50 105.57 1826 89.52 
282.89 
1827 86.35 
>"t Excludes uncompensated overseas remittances amounting to 2.29 pesos per 1828 70.19 80.52 187.84 
capita. 1829 88.34 80.42 199.93 
SOllr((; See Table 3. 1830 to9.41 123.19 240.75 
1831 112.07 248.19 
1832 125.08 128.78 153.17 
1833 99.38 100.00 137.36 
1834 124.53 214.37 
1843 67 .0 88.33 
1844 77.2 
1845 125.0 65 .0 
Sector/Year 1910 1848 98.49 ll6.96 114.15 
Agriculture 21.9 26.8 27.0 25.0 19.9 21.2 1849 66.29 101.43 84.77 
Livestock 19,4 17.3 12A 13.6 18.0 12.2 1850 40.99 
Forestry 3.0 3.0 1.S 2.4 0.3 0.3 
Fish and Game 0.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1856 76.66 
Mining 8.2 6.2 9.7 lOA 6.3 8,4 
Manufacturing 22.3 18.3 21.6 16.2 12.8 14.9 1860 125.0 84.3 78.3 1 
Construction 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Transportation 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.3 2.7 1863 97,79 54.03 
Government 4.2* 7.4 6.8 11.2 8.9 7.2 
Commerce 16.7 16.9 16.7 16.9 16.8 19.3 1869 79.93 99.72 
Miscellaneous l.l 13.1 12.9 1870 60.56 18 1,47 n O.90 
Total 100.0 
1871 38.5 1 139.19 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NOIr: This (able is based on the deflated estimates of secto ral output reported on 1873 91.61 53A5 122 .18 
Table 3. See Appendix for current peso es timates (which yield slightly different 
percentage figures)' 1877 144.7 
,., Does not include net fi scal rem ittances to Spanish treasury. Total government 
64.63 revenues, including th ese remittances, amounted to 7.8 percent of colonial 1879 82.31 138.43 
inco me. 
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Table 6 (Cont') 
























































Now; The IB77 national estimate in the table differs from both Busto and the Cole· 
gio de Mexico estimates. The former produced an aggregate estimate of national 
maize output wh ich implied a percapita output of549.3 kilos in 1877. The Colegio se· 
ries (cited above for the Porfirian data which appear reliable ) cut the Busto estimate 
by abou t half to 282.5. Neither of these estimates seems plausible. Some o f the output 
data for Nuevo Leon later in the period reach these levels, but only for the three 
towns which exported large surplu ses to other areas.Sindico (1975) reports statewide 
maize output begin ning in 1873 for scattered years; between 1873 and 1903, per capita 
output for the state as a whole averaged 125.98 kilos and exceeded 158 kilos in only 
three of 21 years. See Coats worth (1976). 
SOllrw: For national estimates: 1800 is the Quiros' estimate (see text),1845 and 1860 
are imputed, 1877 is based on the reports submitted to th e Ministry of the Treasury 
and published in Busto (1880, m),and 1892 to 1907 are in llitad{sticOJ (n.d.: 62). The 
Mexico City data are taken from documents in th e AAM, Ramo de Alcabalas, vol. 2, 
which provide monthly data on the quantities of agricultural products entering the 
city gates. Mexico City population estimates are from Orozco y Berra (1973). The 
Nuevo Leon series are based on data in Sindico (1975). 
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Table 7 
Per Capita Production and Consumption of W heat, Rye, and Sugar (Kilograms) 
Year ! Wheat I Wheat Flourl I Rye ! Sugar 
1792 138.1


























1860 15.0 4.4 8.9 
1877 17.33 1 2.0~ 65.1 
1892 17.4 8.6 78.7 
1893 18.8 8.6 80A 
1894 18.8 10.1 81.8 
1895 19.3 7.6 94.2 
1896 15.1 11.3 94.3 
1897 18A 10.8 86.3 
1898 19.4 8.6 94.2 
1899 19.8 10.1 87.8 
1900 20.1 9.3 93.1 
1901 18.3 9.4 95.1 
1 Perez Hernandez (1862) estimated wheat flour output per capita at 27.9 kilos; 
the 1860 figure here is discussed in the text. . . 
2 Mex ico City consumption; a ll othe ~ da~a are natl~nal estimates. 
3 Several estimates of wheat productIOn m 1877 eXist; both Busto (1880) and 
the E.rtadl;ticas (n.d.) put it at 35 kilos per capita. . 
4 Rye output is estimated by Busto and the ErtadfJlic4-s (n.d.) at 24 kilos per 
capita. 
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1'lble 7 (Cont.) 
Per Capita Production and Consumption of Wheat, Rye, and Sugar (Kilograms) 
Year I Wheat I Wheat Flour l I Rye I Sugar 
1902 19.2 9.1 11).9 
1903 19.9 8.3 Ul.1 
1904 17.2 9.7 120.0 
1905 19.4 8.7 108,3 
1906 20.2 8,9 107.1 




SOllrcu: For all products, the series beginning in 1892 arc take n from E.rladfJliraJ {n.d.}. 
For w heat, the 1800 figure is from Quir6s ( 1973) , that of 1802 is from Ortiz de Ayala 
(1%8), and the figures for 1845, 1860 and 1877 are explained in the text. For wheat 
flour, rye and sugar, the 1792 data are fro m the Revillagigedo census and refer to 
Mex ico City co nsump.tion only. The w~eat flour series for Mexico City fro m 1817-23, 
1834-38 and 184;-45 IS taken from excIse tax collection dam in AAM, Ramo de Alea-
bala~, vol.. 2, and from data in Orozco y Berra (1973). These sources provided the 
MeX ICO CIty data for rye as well. The 1860 estimates of rye and sugar are from Perez 
Hernandez ( 1862). 
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Table 8 
Pcr Capita Consumption and Production of Livestock (Number o f Heads) 
Bcd Beef Mutton Mutton 
Mexico Nationa l Mexico National 
Year City Output City Output l 
1756 0.0982 
1792 0.125 2.14 
1800 0,095 0.78 
18~4-38 0.086 1.02 
1843 0.134 0,80 
1844 0.130 0,85 
1845 0.128 0.070 0.76 OAO 
1849 0.162 0,82 
1850 0,185 0,82 
1851 0.71 
1860' 0.053 0.37 
1861 0,094 1.39 
18774 0.086 0.11 
1878 0.084 0.11 
1897 0.081 0.11 
1898 0,075 0,14 
1899 0.067 0.12 
1900 0.079 0.12 
1901 0.078 0.11 
1902 0.081 0.12 
1903 0.078 0.12 
1904 0.072 0.11 
1905 o,on 0.12 
1906 0.079 0,13 
1907 0,080 0.13 
I The mutton data include goats from \897 to 1907. 































3 Perez Hernandez ( 1862) g ives higher l860 estimates of 0. 118, 0.66 and 0.30 
respectively. 
47 
4 The lliladfJJica (n.d.) reports figures for 1878; we have used their estimate fo r 
constructing the 1877 GOP estimate, and thus cite it for this year. 
Sources: The 17)6 figure (which refers to Cuern avaca, not Mexico City) is from Barrett 
(1974 : 533-534). The rest of the Mexico City data are based o n excise tax collections 
reported in sources cited in Tab le 3. National output in 1800 is from Quir6s (1973). 
The national estimates for 1865 and 1860 arc d iscussed in the text. T he 1877 figures are 
from the lliladlilicas (n.d.: 84), as are aU the national data from 1897 to 1907. The 1878 
figures are from Busto (1880). They appear to be the p rincipa l source for the estimates 
in the f..f/(J(hili((lJ (n.d.). 
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T.1ble 9 Table 10 
Estimates of Manufacturing Output PrniOIl '1 t-. It· hil ~ I \li ned ill Mexican Mints, 1800-1859 (Millions of I)csos) 
(Value Added in Thousands of Current Pesos) Y ear I t >tnI'll! I Y C:lf I Output I Year I Output 
Products 1800 1845 1860 1800 Ill ,] lH 7.0 11.7 1840 12.7 
A. Food ProctSsing 1801 1/, (, 182 1 9.4 1841 13.5 
Sugar Products 553' 3373 1802 I H.l1 1 ~22 9.8 1842 1'.0 
Bread and Baking Flour 4000 1803 J.\J IH23 9.8 1843 12.1 
Mczeal 1800 2577 180.1 l,/ I H12t( 9.6 1844 13.7 
Chocolate 415 780 1805 u, J. IH25 8.9 1845 18.) ' 
Snow and Ice 400 1806 .. if .I IH26 8.2 1846 15.7 
Pulque 3785 1488 1807 U ~ IA27 10.4 1847 16.4 
Wine and Liquors 1176 1808 1 1,/ 1828 10.2 1848 19.2 
B. Challic4/s 
1809 UI./. 1829 12.2 1849 19.4 
Wax Candles 7403 
18\0 I') } UnO 11.6 1840 J9A 
8582 1811 14,/ 183 1 10.3 1851 18.2 
Matches 4340 1812 ,) ,(, 1832 12.2 18S2 113.2 
Soap 3395 2692 1813 ').'1 1833 12.2 1853 17.0 
Gunpowder 700 85 181.-1 u .. ~ 1834 13.0 1854 17. 2 
Vegetable Oils 500 124 1815 fi l , IH35 ll.B 1855 lH,O 
Paints and Dyes 100 1816 III. / 1836 11.5 1856 IM .7 
Paper 6366 1817 1n,1 1837 11.5 1857 23.3 ' 
C. reX/ill ! 1818 IU 1838 13.3 1858 20.0 
Cottons 2270 2700 3162 18 19 I \ .5 1839 12.5 1859 IH ./I 
Woolens 6201 2700 2367 1 These tiJ.lllrt·s iUt'llldl' prnduction of nonminted metals exports ; for 111 /1') , til t: 
Silks 100 500 data Me in M:' yc r ( IH5J, II : 99) ; for 1857. the data arc in p c.: rcz Ill:ru :lud c1. 
Palm and Agave 350 350 350 (1862, 135) . 
D. Tobacco Product! 7061 4320 Sources: Fo1' I HO(l- IH ~ll , Orm.co y Berra (1857); for 1855- 1859. P~rc i'. I krn ~ lIdc '". (111(11.: 
E. Ltather Goods 
135) . 
Sheepskins and Chamois 5488 
Saddlery 50 




Silver Goods 300 
Carriages 200 
Games, Musical Instruments 350 73 
Lacemaking, Ribbons 150 
Goldsmithing 50 
Wax Chandlers 90 
Porcelain and Crystal 1638 
H. Iron , Sud, MunitiollJ 7626 
L Not separately estimated 36079 17053 
Totals 54,541 49,955 65,866 
Soums: See text. 
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Table lJ 
Expenditures of the Federal Government of Mexico, 1822-1860 
(Millions of Pesos) 
Year Expenditures I Year 
1822 13.') 1 1841 
1823 11.2 1842 
1824 15.2 1 1843 
182) 9.82 1844 
1825-26 14.6 1845 
1826-27 13.5 1846 
1827-28 11.0 1847 
1828-29 12.2 1848-49 
1829-30 11.9 1849-50 
1830-31 16.4 1850-51 
1831-32 15.73 185 J-j2 
1832-33 20.6~ 1852-53 
1833-34 18.6 1853-54 
1834-35 12.71 1854-55 
1835-36 25.0 1855-56 
1836-37 17.6 1856-57 
1837-38 16.1 1857-58 
1839 25.7 1858-59 
1840 19.9 1859-60 
1 Budget; actual expenditures not available. 
2 Six months. 
3 May be incomplete; see source. 





















5 These figures arc rough estimates by Romero for years when no data cou ld 
be found. 
SOllm: Memoria tit Hacimda, MExico (1870: 67 ff.). 
Table 12 
Foreign Trade as Percent of GDP, 1800-1910 







1 Average for 1796-1805. 








3 No import estimate available; assumed equal to exports. 
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Tuble 13 
EXlcrorl1 'l'1,lIk I),ltll. IH21-1B60 (Millions of Pesos) 
Year '](ll:d Ii xI1nr!'; 'Jilta! Imports U.S.A., UK. U.S.A. only 
and France 
1821 i) .i 7.2 
1822 
1823 2. --\1 3.9 
1824 Ii .') ' 11.9 
1825 5.0 19.1 
1826 7.6 15.5 3.9 
1827 IZ. l 11i ,9 10.6 5.2 
1828 14.\ 9.9 6.4 4.8 
1829 5.8 5.0 
1830 14.4 5.2 
\B31 14.9 5.2 
\832 7. 1 4.3 
1833 10.5 5.5 
1834 10.0 8.7 
IR35 14.5 9.5 
1836 9.2 5.6 
1837 8.4 5.7 
1838 6.4 3.1 
1839 7.7 5.5 
IStiO 7.6 4.2 
1841 6.7 3.5 
1842 5.7 2.0 
1843 12,1 \ 23.5 6.9 2.8 
1844 11.5 2 1.7 6.7 2.4 
1845 6.4 1.7 
1846 5.1 1.8 









1856 13.64 21.64 3.7 
1857 16.44 13.94 3.6 
1858 16.24 11.44 3.3 
1859 7.94 15.32 2.9 
1860 13.4 15.2 5.3 
1 Veracruz only. 2 Veracruz and Alvarado only. 3 Exports of gold, silver and p(do 
de rime only. 4 Veracruz and Tampico only. 
Sourcts: Herrera Canales (19n: chap. 2); Lerdo de Tejada (1967); Memoria de Harimda, 
Mlxi" (I870: 236); Romero (1898: 173-174); Stevens (Ms. 1983: chap. 5); Diaz (1974, I: 
302 and Tables 5, 9, 13 and 19). 
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Table 14 
S,:t.:tor:IJ Output Es timates, 1800-1877 (Thousands of Current Pesos) 
St'LifJl" I Peoduct I 1800 I 1845 I 
1\.l!.rimf'"rr 49,046 67,721 
Maize 19,000 27, 150 
Wheat 5,000 7,652 
Sugar 4,500 4,800 
Cotton 730 2,400 
Cacao 285 1,200 
Other Grains 12,000 NES 
Tobacco 626 NES 
Other Products 6,905 24,519 
LiJ)tJ/o(k 44 ,825 44,002 
Beef Cattle 2,400 4,125 
Mutton 13,000 8,250 
Pork 9,000 12,750 
Wool 1,200 300 
Milk and Cheese 4,500 NES 
Chickens, Eggs 9,000 NES 
Hides 1,725 NES 
Other Products 4,000 18,577 
FOWl!)' 7,405 8,083 
Lumber 850 NES 
Woods and Charcoal 6,500 NES 
Dycwoods 55 NES 
Other Products 8,083 
Fish and game 250 2,693 
Mining and smelling 22,870 22, 16 1 
Sil ver 17,899 18, 128 1 
Gold 787 
Other Metals 1,433 NES 
Non-metallic Min erals 2,751 NES 
Other Products 4,033 
M OI1I1[a(/lIf(J 54,541 49,955 
Food Processing, Drink 15,934 NES 
Chemical Products 12,098 NES 
Textiles 8,921 5,917 
Tobacco Products 7,061 N ES 







































1,481 1,6 16 
6,100 6,733 ,/,,.,/ 111/1<11'1 7,483 
1~lisull(IIJ(OIf! 
Grand Total 
1 Includes both gold and silver. 
NES = Not estimated separately. 
1.0,367 
40,862 
2,571 
240,3 18 
20,000 
4:>,782 
268,413 292,371 
